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When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 it was interpreted by many as the dawn of a new era of unrestricted travel and free movement for socialist citizens who had been prevented until then from exercising those freedoms by an authoritarian political regime. Cold War understandings of socialism and capitalist market economies as two diametrically opposed systems led many to assume that mobility and freedom of travel were the preserve of citizens of western states, while socialist governments on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain lacked both the means and the political will to enable modern forms of travel, transport and communication.
This volume challenges this assumption by considering the significance of mobility for socialist interpretations of modernity, and the specific implementation and practical re-working of different mobility constellations in states that were part of the Soviet and East European socialist sphere until 1989/90. The authors of this edited collection trace a plurality of mobility practices, policies and constellations in and between socialist states and show that post-socialist mobilities likewise confound many assumptions about progress in twenty-first century post-modernity.
The volume arises from the realization that the wide ranging, interdisciplinary area of socialist and post-socialist studies and the now established mobilities 'paradigm' are two areas of interest which, while hitherto relatively distinct, can be brought together very fruitfully. On the one hand, to a large extent it has been their particular management and brought about particular articulations of power, politics, materiality, human agency and imagination that shaped both people's experiences of 'actually existing' socialism and their understandings of the limits and possibilities for action within the regime. Thus, as several authors in this volume demonstrate, the enhancements in transport and communication systems that state socialist regimes implemented from the 1930s onwards were experienced as significant improvements and enjoyed by many, yet restrictions on travel to capitalist states, the awareness of state surveillance and frustrations with the inefficiencies of ailing transport infrastructures also moved many to question the optimistic claims of political leaders and necessitated quasi-illegal, subversive practices that were often even tolerated by the state. Just as specific constellations of power and politics shaped disparate experiences of mobility in socialist societies, however, so today mobility carries politically charged connotations and it has become an experiential domain through which people evaluate the changes that have ensued since 1989 (see below). Socialist and postsocialist studies are therefore well placed to explore the relationship between power and mobility. De Certeau's (1984) distinctions between 'strategy' (emanating, for instance, from the state) and 'tactics' (i.e., citizen responses to this strategy), offers a useful framework for understanding constellations of power and mobility in socialist and postsocialist contexts. In the words of Cresswell (2006: 48) , 'De Certeau's mobilization of forms of mobility as against the power which comes with fixity is symptomatic of a wider move to invest mobility with subversive meanings'. With their expansive attempts to control and 'fix' the various mobilities of their citizens -not unlike Foucault's (1977) observations on panopticism -socialist states especially opened up mobility as a front in resistances which ranged from activities such as using alternative networks to acquire parts for cars, through to full-scale cross border defection. A 'state verses citizen' dynamic, of course, is an oversimplification of the structure of regimes which very often could not fix the mobilities of their people in the face of the stubbornness of the mobile human body or the unwieldiness of new technologies and infrastructures. Nor does it enable clarity over who was doing this fixing and who was resisting it. An analysis of mobility and power as mutually enforcing/conflicting forces, however, is an invaluable starting point for appreciating how deeply political any kind of mobility practice could be in socialist states and indeed in the post-Cold War world in general. As Dietzsch shows in Chapter 12, it also provokes a more careful examination of the power-knowledge constellations that uphold contemporary logics of mobility and of the possibilities for resisting them.
One of the prevailing preoccupations within the field of mobilities studies is social change -transport and climate change, to take one example. It is here that we see the merging of mobilities with our second point of interest -modernity. Mobility is apparently symptomatic of the 'modern age'. Popular and scientific discourses of modernity frequently adopt a binary time-space perspective whereby (late) modernity is associated with an unsettling increase in speed, mobility, complexity and change (Berman 1983; Bauman 2000) , while stasis, slowness and immobility are ascribed to social and cultural 'others' living 'elsewhere', whose conditions of life change only gradually or at the hands of intervening forces (Adey 2006) . Whether these others are romanticized, treated as inferior, or both, in this time-space construction it none the less seems as though speed, movement and radical change are the preserve of advanced capitalist societies in the global North, and particularly their hyper-mobile elites, while others are stuck in a slow moving, less complex past (Kaplan 1996; Cresswell 2010; Macnaghten and Urry 1998) . Chiming with feminist and post-colonial critiques of the binary frameworks and exclusions entailed in value-laden associations of modernity with speed, movement, complexity and rapid change, recent scholarship in socialist and post-socialist studies has questioned the validity of such binary chronological models for explaining the diversity of ways in which time and space were modulated, experienced and culturally framed in socialist societies. Analysts of post-socialist transformations in particular have further pointed out that the divergence in paths of 'transition' cannot be understood through an ordered, unidirectional chronological lens (Pickles and Smith 1998; Stenning and Hörschelmann 2008; Hörschelmann 2002) .
Socialist/post-socialist scholars also need to be careful not to fetishize socialist and post-socialist societies. As Hann (2002: 9) argues, some developments within socialist/post-socialist countries have mirrored those unfolding in other places, under other regimes. The growth of new technologies, for example, and how best to both acquire and control them, could perhaps be considered a universal challenge. Writing at the time of revelations about the extent of NSA (US) and GCHQ (UK) spying, it hardly seems justified to cast Soviet style spying desires -if not techniques -as from another age. Likewise, in a world preoccupied with terrorism and increasingly concerned with austerity politics and 'protecting' national welfare systems, international controls of the movement of people are arguably growing rather than receding. As Cresswell (2006: 49) points out, the whole being of states -even 'western' ones -is tied up with the control of mobility in various guises, a point as valid for post-modernity as modernity.
Ideas generated through debates about mobility, then, can deepen analyses and understandings of socialist and post-socialist societies. The focus on mobilities, on the contingent relations between different mobilities, on different cultural frameworks for understanding mobilities, and on the power relations they entail, can produce rich insights into the politics and diverse experiences and perceptions of 'really-existing' socialisms and post-socialisms. Perhaps most importantly, instead of the western centric distinction between static and slow-moving socialist regimes on the one hand and rapid post-socialist transitions towards hyper-mobile, liquid modernities on the other (see Macnaghten and Urry 1998; Bauman 2000; Castells 2010) , this book seeks to highlight the centrality of mobility to Soviet sphere socialist ideologies of modernity, to the material-political construction of socialist economies, geographies, social relations and life-worlds to the everyday experience of socialism, and to contestations of socialist state politics. Not only does this recognition make it easier to identify continuities between socialist and post-socialist mobilities and relations across the Iron Curtain, but it also underlines the relevance of cultural understandings of mobility and capitalist modernity for people's assessments of the apparent successes and failures of post-socialist transformations. The diversity of experiences and the inequalities produced by post-socialist transformations along different pathways (Stark and Bruszt 2001; Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Bradshaw and Stenning 2004; Hann 2004; Smith and Timár 2010) can be more fully appreciated through a focus on the differential mobilities which have been produced.
Constellations of socialist mobility: power, practice, materiality and scale
Mobility was central to socialist politics, economics, ideology and everyday life. Metaphorically, the ideological commitment to 'progress towards a better future' in itself implies a focus on different types of enabling mobilities. Tangibly, the energetic, and collective, road building projects of socialist Albania offer a good illustration of this (Dalakoglou 2012) .The expansionist ambitions of the Soviet state, furthermore, meant that vast resources of labour, finance, technology and materials were invested in mobility projects to enable access to previously relatively inaccessible places and regions, particularly in Siberia, the Far East, and the Arctic North, for resource exploitation. Some have suggested that this Soviet expansionism was not unlike colonialism, involving comparable structures of oppression (Verdery 2004) . Certainly, without the enormous carceral economy of Soviet socialism, and the forced labour of many, it is unlikely that this expansion would have been possible. While this particular 'assemblage' of political power, embodied labour and materiality was unique to socialism, it shows why a political understanding of mobilities is indispensable and why, perhaps, current analyses remain too tame and silent on the oppressions which are entailed in the very establishment of mobility infrastructures. Critiques have centred on differential access to, and experiences of, mobility but the exploitative relations which made (and still make) the expansion of mobility possible are too rarely addressed. Globally, today, some of the most high-profile infrastructure projects (e.g., for major sporting events) rely on the poorly paid labour of millions of workers whose labour is part of the 'moorings' on which mobility relies.
In Russia, these forced labourers were increasingly joined by those who settled in the 'new' territories as a result of a system of incentives and rewards. Their migration and resettlement led not only to new needs for travel infrastructures to complement the transportation of goods and materials, but also the extension and maintenance of new communication systems. Enabling the social relations and co-presences that Urry (2002 Urry ( , 2007 regards as a key component of mobility, across the vast distances of the Soviet empire, became a major challenge for the socialist regime. The complex coordination of networked socialist economies, the maintenance of spatially expansive hegemonic ideologies of socialism and the reconciliation of socialist biopolitics with the needs and desires of populations relied on the establishment and maintenance of an enabling communications infrastructure. The latter, however, also created new pressures on the system, as control was made both possible and more difficult to achieve (see Zakharova, Chapter 2).
Communications and transport infrastructures became neuralgic points which highlighted and co-produced many of the inequalities and inefficiencies of the socialist system. Rail, road and air travel thus required 'mooring' through maintenance and coordination, which an ailing socialist economy struggled to deliver. The extension of mobility infrastructures and communication systems that was such a crucial plank in the ideological scaffolding of socialist modernity thus became one of its major stumbling blocks. It could be argued that one of the main failures of the socialist system was its inability to sustain the investment and labour required to 'moor' its mobility systems over time -to maintain and not just establish its physical infrastructure, to respond to the inevitable deterioration of its recalcitrant materiality (Latour 2000) , and to manage changes in technologies as well as in socio-cultural expectations that the system partly provoked through its promotion of growth-focused modernity, as new mobilities also enabled the spread of ideas and new practices beyond the complete control of state power. Contradictions inherent in the socialist political economy were thus both reflected in, and produced by its dominant mobility constellations. While the successful launches of Sputnik and Soyus into space (see Maurer et al. 2011) were staged ideologically as representations of the apparently unstoppable progress of Soviet socialism, realities closer to the ground departed significantly from this glittering image, as people often experienced time as slowing right down in activities such as queuing for even basic commodities (see Verdery 1996) or coping with unreliable trains or badly maintained roads. Zakharova (Chapter 2) explains, for instance, that in post-Stalinist Russia some communities in newly industrialized parts of the North and Far East became completely cut-off during the rainy seasons as roads became muddy and impassable. The contrast between spectacular and everyday realities of mobility, therefore, contributed to the erosion of public trust in socialist regimes and the legitimacy of their ruling elites.
Accumulating disruptions in the flows of people, information, material resources and goods created pressures on other parts of the socialist economy, politics and society that helped to 'unmoor' socialist relations. Increasingly, state authorities had to rely on informal social practices of 'mooring' that were a response to, needed by, but also undermining of socialist social and economic relations. Thus, while the voluntary labour of garage owners described by Tuvikene in this volume became the glue which held an otherwise failing automobile system together, it also provided new spaces for socializing and individual mobility. Likewise, Zakharova (Chapter 2) shows that communication systems evolved in the Soviet Union as a complex tangle of controlling mechanisms and sometimes more, oftentimes less politically subversive communication practices. In this volume too, Cirniala (Chapter 3) proposes that these apparent contradictions between state controlled and managed mobilities on the one hand, and 'recalcitrant' plural practices of living with, within, and between the formal spaces of socialism can be conceptualized well, as already discussed, through de Certeau's framework of strategies and tactics.
Both the ideological claims and material realities of socialism were significantly measured against its ability to provide smooth, fast and equal conditions for the transport of people, goods and information. As contradictions and tensions accumulated that socialist systems of power and control could no longer contain, the 'egalitarian' pretences of these systems were also put under pressure and differential access to travel and transported goods became a cornerstone for critique, fuelling much opposition. In socialist societies, as elsewhere, the question was thus not one of mobility or immobility, but whose mobility was enabled or restricted, and how specific relations of power and mobility were managed. The 'politics of mobility' was central to both the cementing and justification of socialist state power, and to its subversion and contestation. Different socialist states also found different answers to the management of the flows of people, goods, materials and information that they had promoted but struggled to contain. These different answers provoked several military interventions and assertions of supremacy by the Soviet state, as well as a nuanced system of socialist networking and collaboration that conceded, and sometimes had to concede, certain departures from Soviet socialist norms. In part, these concessions were occasioned by intersections between socialist and Western states that generally happened below the radar of official socialist propaganda, but were obvious to those who were permitted to travel west, and to the many workers in socialist factories who were told to prioritize the production of goods for western clients. The reliance of socialist states on western finance to fill the holes produced by its own inefficiencies, and the converse flows of goods as payment for those loans, clearly did not fit with the self-reliance and growth rhetoric of socialist 'alternative modernity'. The mobility of people, goods, ideas and finance across the Cold War divide became a further key contradiction that socialist regimes had to manage, struggle with, and find different answers for.
With the dawn of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, those differences became pronounced, highly visible, and eventually irreconcilable. The collapse of state-socialism was in crucial ways occasioned by the political will of Hungarian and Czechoslovak authorities, which permitted refugees from the GDR to flee across its borders to the West, and by the decision of Soviet leaders not to intervene. Having become a major cause of protest against socialist regimes over decades of Cold War division, freedom of travel, and of the travel of ideas, became a key motivation for, and symbol of, the revolutionary changes that ensued from perestroika and the fall of the Berlin Wall.
As the above shows, socialist and post-socialist mobilities make visible, and need to be understood as produced through, specific articulations of scale. The geo-political here is intimately tied to the regional, national and local, and these scales are in many ways transformed and brought into new constellations through mobility. If we focus on the spheres of everyday life and social practices, this becomes equally clear. The different socialist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had a fundamental impact on the mobilities of ordinary people. On the one hand, socialist ruling elites worked hard to control the international mobility of people, attempting to censor images and communications from nonaligned countries and making it almost impossible to emigrate or travel abroad, while at the same time keeping much freer lines of mobility and communication open within the socialist bloc. These different regimes also shaped, purposefully or inadvertently, people's more 'mundane mobilities and banal travels', thus not only choreographing mobility but also reconstituting daily place-making activities in the process (see Binnie et al. 2007 ). Running a household in a shortage economy, for example, both positioned people in slow moving queues for hours on end (Merkel 1998; Veenis 1999), effectively rendering them immobile at certain times of the day, and necessitated a certain relationship with the immediate neighbourhood -specific routes to and from work to take in certain shops. State sponsored holiday policies ensured that many families travelled extensively within their countries, but the presence of troops, militias and the secret police also had negative impacts upon people's ability to move freely around their neighbourhoods. For some people the state of the public transport systems dominated their daily routines. In addition to all these physical mobilities, imaginative mobilities were very important to daily life in the socialist bloc, not least the presence of the 'Imagined West' (Yurchak 2006), brought to people through western goods (Burrell 2011a) and popular culture. Mobilities theories clearly offer a distinctly geographical prism through which to reassess these spatialities of everyday life in the socialist bloc.
They also remind us to consider how mobility is produced and experienced through difference and the power relations it entails. With regards to socialist societies, it is important to note that experiences of mobility differed markedly depending on people's standing in political and social hierarchies, privileges endowed to different sections of the workforce, to economic, cultural and political elites, and the corresponding restrictions on mobility that affected anyone suspected of 'subversive', oppositional activities. Gender also remained a differentiating factor in a system that pursued equality through work and universal social welfare. The particular restrictions suffered by women as a result of subordinating reproductive labour to the productivist logic, while maintaining patriarchal gender relations in politics and economic management, thus also affected their everyday mobilities. They continued to have most of the responsibility for care work and the management of households in the shortage economy, while few enjoyed the travelling privileges that came with power and authority. In retrospect, however, many women today credit the socialist system with providing the necessary material conditions for gender equality, and find these sorely missing in really-existing post-socialism (Einhorn 1993; Gal and Kligman 2000; van Hoven 2002; Hörschelmann and van Hoven 2003) . Mobility was further experienced, imagined and contested differently depending on age. On the one hand, the inefficiencies of the socialist system and its increasing inability to deliver its welfare promises placed older people in positions of greater vulnerability and dependency, while on the other, young people found their life chances increasingly limited by socialist restrictions on the travel of people, goods, ideas and cultural commodities. Changing cultural expectations here met with different generational demands for mobility, and many young people's imaginations of desirable, modern lives departed significantly from what the system allowed or enabled.
Access to mobility infrastructures and experiences of socialist timespaces further differed between urban and rural, central and peripheral places. Although state investments in mobility infrastructures and in the social, cultural and economic facilities of far-flung places were centrally concerned with eradicating such differences, they persisted in a variety of forms. Highlighting these relationships between social, cultural and spatial differences and the politics, experience and representation of mobility helps us to develop a more nuanced understanding of socialist everyday lives as well as of the struggles that led to gradual and radical transformations of the regimes. It also helps us to gain a better understanding of the complexities and perplexities of post-socialist transformations.
Reconfiguring mobilities: change and continuity in postsocialist constellations of mobility
Mobility has become a heavily charged term in recent discourses and reflections on post-socialist developments. The successes and failures of post-socialist governments and economies are largely measured against how they support or restrict mobilities and the social differences and inequalities that emerge around it, or that entrench those that existed before (Lemon 2000; Stenning 2005) . While recognizing again that there are limitations with the category 'post-socialist' for analysing fully the changes which have taken place in former Soviet sphere countries -not least the difficulty in deciding what is 'post-socialist' about developments which may be happening elsewhere too -a focus on mobility does help to illuminate the specific multi-scalar changes which have been taking place under the umbrella of post-socialist transformation. It is useful to consider international and domestic experiences of mobility in turn, as they highlight different, although inevitably overlapping, facets of post-socialist change.
The collapse of socialism brought new international mobilities -new advertising and international business ventures, an increasing globalization of popular culture (see Pilkington et al. 2002) and new neo-liberal ideologies in place of 'old' socialist ones. It also brought an upsurge in international migration. The years 1989 The years , 2004 and 2007 appear important markers for changes in international migration regimes in the postsocialist world, physically and symbolically reinforced by the growth of transport infrastructures -such as budget airlines (Burrell 2011b) -linking eastern and western Europe. International mobilities have loosened and transformed, evidenced in large-scale westward migrations, but it is also clear that the post-socialist experience of moving across borders has been deeply asymmetrical. There was, perhaps, a sort of uniformity in the immobility regimes of the countries within the socialist bloc. Even though the opportunity for international migration, and indeed international travel, inevitably varied from country to country and person to person (as illustrated in Stefan and Kassymbekova's chapters in this volume), the ability of bodies to cross borders was similarly, and certainly ideologically, framed and controlled throughout the region. High levels of migration were in evidence in the 1980s -from Poland for example -but this could only be achieved by adhering to certain rules and rehearsing blueprinted state-citizen mobility power games, such as the process of requesting and then waiting anxiously for passports. From this angle, the mobility cornerstones of socialism appear to have given way to new structures of international movement which are (even) more embedded with inequalities, and far more volatile. As Baker, Chapter 8, demonstrates, war in the former Yugoslavia fundamentally changed mobility patterns there, not only displacing and 'reordering' existing populations, but bringing in high numbers of western forces and workers, visibly alerting people to the new mobility inequalities manifesting around them.
Post-socialist changes in international mobility are significant, then, on many levels. It is undeniable that for many citizens of former socialist states enhanced freedom of movement has been a genuinely positive development. The volume of migration in the 1990s, again out of Poland but perhaps even more notably from Romania and Albania, certainly suggests an embracement of new opportunities, if also underlining the extent of social hardship experienced in 'transitioning' postsocialist states. But international migration within Europe at the close of the twentieth century was still inscribed with the geo-political inequalities of Cold War continental structuring. Romanians in Spain, Poles in Germany, Albanians in Greece, even East Germans in West Germanythese populations were not automatically welcomed, and sometimes even barely perceived, as fellow Europeans. And while their experiences as immigrants have been no more difficult than those of Turkish guest workers or former colonial migrants, there is a particular framing of Eastern Europe in the Western European imaginary which allows for a deeply rooted othering process to take place. As Kuus (2004: 473) argued on the eve of EU expansion, this framing, immediately recognizable from post-colonial theory, places much of Eastern Europe as 'not-yetfully European'. Ten years on from these observations this framing persists. Given the almost pan-western European alarmist, and in many cases racist, media responses to the 2014 relaxation of labour market restrictions for Romanians and Bulgarians within the EU, it is barely a stretch to find a commonality between the position of the post-colonial and the post-socialist migrant in the maturing post-Cold War world.
As this example suggests, post-socialist migration has had to route many of its paths within or around the expanding mobility structures of the EU. Notwithstanding the various problems and limitations actually experienced by EU migrants, the 'free movers' observed by Favell (2008) are of course those which find themselves within the EU as it enlarges and liberalizes, not outside of it, like much of post-socialist Europe and certainly Eurasia, positioned against Fortress, or more appropriately 'gated community' (van Houtum and Pijpers 2007) Europe. Post-colonial perspectives again bring clarity to the position of the EU vis-à-vis the rest of the world. According to van Houtum and Pijpers 'the European Union is increasingly following a modernist logic of (b)ordering, much resembling the colonial mind-set, that involves the making of a divisive order between the self-claimed illuminated, enlightened beacon and an external world of chaos and darkness ' (2007: 296) . Colonial mindsets, furthermore, are not in short supply. Just as the power of the EU has reconfigured European, and to a certain extent global, mobilities, so has the changing position of Russia as it draws in migrant workers from neighbouring states especially, arguably reconfiguring new neo-colonial powers in the process. A recent issue of the The Economist (7/9/13), for example, noted that Tajikistan is the country most reliant on remittances from overseas workers in the world, such is the disproportionate scale of the Tajik migrant population working in Russia in particular. This has not only had clear implications for the politicization of mobility regimes around Russia -the politics of visas for example -but also illustrates the barely reconstructed post-colonial balance of power in the region, reinforced by the all too familiar second class status endured by migrants from the former Soviet republics living and working in Russia. Post-socialist mobility regimes are a mesh of old and new tensions and suspicions.
As Verdery (2002) pointed out over a decade ago, post-socialist restructuring has always been part of something much larger, embedded in much more fundamentally global shifts in international power. And in this post-Cold War world, technological advances have been used to (bio-)securitize borders and movement in increasingly sophisticated and ideological ways; as with spying, Soviet desires to control mobility were perhaps more prophetic than they were accomplished. It is the example of spying, however, which may reinforce the significance of the post-socialist legacy within this new global structure. While many countries in Western Europe exhibited fairly muted responses to the revelations of the full extent of US National Security Agency spying, Angela Merkel, of East German background, reacted much more angrily. Divergent histories and experiences among the population of Europe still have sway over present reactions and future decisions. More generally, the links between past and present in mobility, power and control suggest that the ethical and political questions raised by socialist/postsocialist mobilities can be important for critiquing new developments and inequalities.
While these important geo-political restructurings, tested by the movement of people, are key to understanding the wider changes of the post-Cold War world, the focus on domestic mobilities arguably reveals even more fundamentally the everyday legacies of socialism and postsocialist transformation. New experiences of poverty and unemployment in many cases shrunk everyday working class spatial routines (see Stenning 2005) , with the loss of subsidized travel and holiday trips impacting heavily on the ability of ordinary people to move around locally, let alone nationally. Some of the old socialist immobilities, of course, also outlasted the formal end of socialism. Queuing for goods intensified in many places in the early 1990s, and the slowness enforced though dealings with governmental bureaucracy has proved resilient across the region generally (on Albania see Vullnetari and King, this volume). On the other hand, the pace of new urban development and investment during the 1990s changed people's relationships with their home towns and cities, forcing them to learn new ways of moving around, sometimes enticing them but at other times alienating them (Burrell 20011c; Hörschelmann 2009) . At the same time, the rise in social inequalities at a time of severe economic decline and of major reductions in public spending has led to new experiences of immobility in everyday life. Those on low incomes frequently describe a sense of isolation and being 'stuck' in place (Stenning 2005; Hörschelmann and Stenning 2003; Hörschelmann 2005) , both because of the decline in public transport and their inability to connect with, and participate in, new consumer cultures that characterize redeveloped metropolitan centres and shopping areas (cf. Hirt 2012; Stanilov 2007) . Changes in identity, and especially the sense of lost moorings experienced by many of those who lost their previous work-related status, have also contributed to such senses of isolation and immobility. It is important to point out here again that such experiences are not unique to postsocialist societies. Pearce (2013) , in a recent commentary on the effects of austerity on health in the United Kingdom, for instance, explains that stigmatizations of place affect strongly how often people leave their houses and how they travel through the city (also see Warr 2006; Wacquant 2007) . What is different, in comparison, for post-socialist societies is thus perhaps less the experience, extent and severity of inequality, but the stark contrast with an (imagined) socialist past of (relative) equality, esteem for workers, and greater security of livelihoods. In retrospect, significant sections of the population therefore experience their current life-worlds as more restrictive and less mobile than those of the past, even as the world around them appears to have gathered tremendous speed and seems to almost move 'past' them (e.g., on high-speed trains, low-budget flights that cater for tourists, students and migrant workers, private cars, unequally accessible internet connections, etc.).
A focus on pace and change offers complex insights into postsocialist mobilities. The tendency to concentrate on depopulation and the persistence and even growth of immobility regimes risks rehearsing those modernism debates which posit some post-socialist changes as going ever further backwards. While such a discourse of 'going back' is sometimes used as an explicit critique of present realities (Petz 2000; Hörschelmann 2002; Stenning 2005) , there is also another possible interpretation which can inspire an important change in perspective. As Dietzsch's chapter in this volume illustrates, for those who do experience a clash between the immobilities and apparent slowness imposed on them by state policies, economic decline and mobility restructuring, deceleration can become a positively charged, critical response to the worst excesses of 'modern' life and the harm it causes to human lives and the environment.
Some of the most interesting observations on everyday post-socialist mobilities have come through the study of transport systems directly. As Bole and Gabrovec show (Chapter 11), a new diversity of mobility experience has evolved, swapping the commonality of queuing and bartering for car parts for variably increased levels of motorization, while the public transport systems established to support the socialist workforce have become more stratified by class, reflecting wider social and economic changes. What Simić and Sgibnev both show (again this volume), however, is how important transport has become in shaping post-socialist citizen-state relationships. While Sgibnev demonstrates the visual politicization of trolleybuses in Central Asia, Simić reflects on how public transport has become an important metaphor for the absent or underperforming state in Serbian everyday life. We are back where we started. Mobilities, socialist and post-socialist, tell us about the intrinsic balance between state and citizen, about inequalities between these citizens and about where the power lies in different societies. What the chapters in this volume are able to do is tease out where these im/balances and relationships carry overtly socialist or post-socialist markers -the continuation of commuting subsidies in Slovenia, the lack of trust in the state in Serbia, and the ideological insecurity of the government in Tajikistan.
Chapter summaries
The chapters in this book -written from a wide range of disciplinary perspectives -are part of a wider effort to bring specificity to the mobilities literature and to push understandings of socialism and postsocialism further. They tell us about the impact of politics and power on the everyday mobilities of ordinary people, explore what mobility meant and means in the specific contexts of socialist and post-socialist regimes and societies, and how it is practiced in the social and political contexts which oscillate around them. The geographic range of the chapters is unavoidably limited -not all countries which could be represented are covered in the volume -but we hope that the richness of the empirical data gathered and analysed through these contributions provide an exciting starting point for further investigations into the myriad intersections between mobility, socialism and post-socialism.
